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ABSTRACT
Before the establishment of the Federal Circuit, the system of patent enforcement was deeply flawed,
with the circuit courts then responsible for reviewing district court patent decisions harboring widely
varying attitudinal views in the interpretation of the patent law. Suggestions for solving the problem
through a single specialized appellate patent court were consistently rejected due to general hostility
to specialized courts.
The formation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 initially appeared to solve the problem in providing
uniform and predictable rules governing the enforcement of patents, an essential aspect of the court’s
mission. The Supreme Court did not provide any obstacles to this early problem-solving but, in about
2001, the Court’s interest in the Federal Circuit’s holdings increased exponentially.
The end result has been significantly detrimental to the implementation of the Federal Circuit’s
mission, creating uncertainty and a lack of predictability in the enforcement of patents, undermining
the very reason the Federal Circuit was established. Among the main culprits are the Supreme Court’s
aversion to bright line rules and its interest in bringing the Federal Circuit into conformity with the
general law, an aversion and interest which are misguided and inimical to the public interest in a
sound patent system.
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THE SUPREME COURT: A HELP OR A HINDRANCE TO THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT'S MISSION?
DONALD R. DUNNER*
Before the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the system of patent
enforcement was deeply flawed. Specifically, the circuit courts then responsible for
reviewing district court decisions in patent cases harbored widely varying attitudinal
views in the interpretation of the patent law, ranging from one extreme in the 8th
Circuit -- which was totally hostile to patents -- to the other extreme in the 5th and 7th
Circuits -- which were totally hospitable to patents. The end result of this disparity in
views was a patent jurisprudence lacking in uniformity and predictability, resulting in
rampant forum shopping between friendly and hostile circuits by patent owners and
accused infringers. That, in turn, had a direct impact on the willingness of innovators
to invest the large sums required to bring new technologies to market.
While the problem could have been solved by having a single, specialized
appellate court, the issue of specialized courts had been raised many times before but
consistently rejected due to general hostility to specialized courts. That hostility is best
summed up by a statement made by Judge Simon Rifkind, Co-Chairman of President
Johnson’s Commission on the Patent System, delivered to the House of
Representatives on April 26, 1967:
In my view, when you are dealing with a matter that concerns the general
welfare of the United States, it is not wise to create a small group of men who
become, like the Egyptian Priests, the sole custodians of a body of knowledge
and who sooner or later begin to talk a language that nobody else
understands but which is common only to them and the practitioners that
appear before them and who drift away from those general principles of
equity and morality, which pervade the entire judicial system.
In the mid-1970’s (1974-1975), however, the first of several events took place that
paved the way to solving the problem. That first event was the convening of the Hruska
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, on which I was
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privileged to serve as a patent consultant -- along with one of my patent law colleagues
-- Professor James B. Gambrell.
The Hruska Commission was formed not principally to examine the patent law
but to focus on possible modifications of the Federal Court Appellate system to provide
an additional layer of review of circuit court opinions to supplement the limited review
provided by the Supreme Court. As an adjunct to its efforts, the Commission asked
Professor Gambrell and me to examine whether the patent system was functioning
adequately, and whether it was desirable to modify the appellate review of patent
decisions by the formation of a specialized appellate patent court. While Professor
Gambrell and I recommended against such a court, as the result of a survey we took of
patent trial lawyers, we also concluded that the patent system was not functioning
properly given the aforenoted widely varying attitudinal views of the circuit courts in
their interpretation of the patent law.
Given the Hruska Commission’s recommendation against the formation of a
specialized patent appeals court and the general hostility towards such courts as
reflected in the Rifkind quote, nothing happened on the subject until the late 1970’s,
when a confluence of events took place which had a dramatic effect on the dialogue
regarding a specialized appellate patent court.
One of those events was the formation by then President Carter of the Advisory
Committee on Industrial Innovation, on which I, Federal Circuit Judge Polly Newman,
and others were privileged to serve. The Carter Committee was charged with
formulating options to deal with a then-perceived innovation crisis. At or about the
same time, Professor Daniel Meador, on leave from the University of Virginia Law
School and serving as an Assistant Attorney General in the Office for Improvements
in the Administration of Justice, came up with the brilliant idea of merging two
existing courts -- the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims -which, at the time, occupied different parts of the same courthouse. The key to his
proposal was including in the jurisdiction of the proposed court not only review of PTO
decisions and almost all district court patent appeals but review of such non-patent
issues as international trade and customs cases, Merit Systems Protection cases, tax
cases, government contracts, veterans’ appeals, and the like. The end result would be
a non-specialized appellate court with exclusive patent jurisdiction designed to avoid
the Rifkind concerns while minimizing forum shopping and providing the desperately
needed uniformity and predictability of patent jurisprudence. And the icing on the
cake was that no new courthouse, no new judges or law clerks, or other court personnel
would be required for this new court.
The genius of this idea was quickly recognized by my colleagues and me in the
Carter Committee, which adopted it as one of its key recommendations. In the face of
some meaningful opposition, the new Federal Circuit court was signed into law by
President Reagan and opened its doors in October 1982.
For many years, the Federal Circuit succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of its
proponents. Its decisions in the patent area brought patent law into the mainstream
of the legal profession. The value of patents increased exponentially. Patent litigation
-- previously the focal point of patent boutiques -- became a staple of many generalist
firms, which clamored to develop their own or acquired patent practices.
For much of this early period, the Supreme Court was content to leave the Federal
Circuit alone, permitting it relatively free reign in eliminating the pre-1982 chaos that
existed and providing the ultimate in developing uniform and predictable rules
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governing the enforcement of patents. Thus, for the period 1982 - 2000, the total of
Federal Circuit patent cases reviewed by the Supreme Court was 11. Beginning in
about 2001, however, the Supreme Court’s review of Federal Circuit patent cases
increased meaningfully, for a total of 47 cases for the period 2001 - 2017, with two
Federal Circuit patent cases currently being on the Court’s docket for hearing.
The reasons given by commentators for this significant increase in interest by the
Supreme Court in Federal Circuit patent cases varies. Included in the list of culprits
are (1) the Court misunderstands the patent law; (2) the Court misunderstands
innovation policy; (3) the Court misunderstands the patent system; (4) the Court
misunderstands the technical facts of patent cases; (5) the Court wants to bring the
Federal Circuit into conformity with the general law; and (6) the Court has an aversion
to the bright line rules that the Federal Circuit has often employed; and there are still
others.
I strongly doubt the accuracy of the first four explanations. Explanations (5) and
(6), however, are on the mark. And to the Supreme Court’s credit, its increased interest
in reviewing Federal Circuit patent holdings has resulted in a number of salutary
decisions, such as Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 124 (2014)
(clarifying the law of indefiniteness as requiring definition of the scope of the invention
with “reasonable certainty”; Microsoft Corp v. i4i, Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011)
(patent invalidity proved by clear and convincing evidence, even where evidence relied
on to prove invalidity was not considered by the PTO).
But whatever the reason, it is abundantly clear that the Supreme Court’s
increased interest in the Federal Circuit’s patent holdings has also been significantly
detrimental to the implementation of the Federal Circuit’s mission. It has created
uncertainty and a lack of predictability in the enforcement of patents, undermining
the very reason the Federal Circuit was established in 1982.
Examples abound, perhaps the best of which is the Supreme Court’s Section 101
jurisprudence, notably Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathologies v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013); and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014). Setting aside whether there is any legal justification for the
two-part patent eligibility test of these cases,1 the courts, the patent bar and the Patent
1 In Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2015), en banc
denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016), the Federal Circuit stated the
following:
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ___, 132
S.Ct. 1289 (2012), the Supreme Court set forth a framework for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from
those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, we determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. at 1297.
If the answer is yes, then we next consider the elements of each claim both
individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. Id.
at 1298. The Supreme Court has described the second step of this analysis as a
search for an “inventive concept” -- i.e., an element or combination of elements that
is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Id. at 1297; see also Digitech
Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“Without additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms
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and Trademark Office are completely lost on how to apply it. Indeed, even the Supreme
Court seems to be at sea in applying the test given the significant inconsistencies
between its § 101 opinions on the subject.
For example, in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978), the Court held that
the novelty of the ineligibility concept is not a determining factor at all, but must be
treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art. In Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981), on the other hand, the Court found patent-eligible a process
for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products involving the
use of a known equation in combination with conventional steps; the equation was not
considered as part of the prior art.
In Mayo, the Court held that it’s not enough to add conventional steps to the
ineligible concept. 566 U.S. at 79. In Diehr, on the other hand, the Court held that:
“It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore
the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process
claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though
all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the
combination was made.” 450 U.S. at 188.
In Mayo, the Court held that it’s proper to include §§ 102, 103 and 112 inquiries
as part of the § 101 inquiry. 566 U.S. at 91. In Diehr, on the other hand, the Court
held that § 101 is a general statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for
patent protection “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title”; the question
of whether a particular invention is novel is wholly apart from whether the invention
falls into a category of statutory subject matter. 450 U.S. at 189-90.
Unfortunately, the uncertainty in the application of the Supreme Court’s § 101
jurisprudence has resulted in the invalidation of significant inventive contributions, a
prime example of which was the pioneering medical invention involved in Ariosa,2
leading to a multitude of opinions by Federal Circuit judges obviously frustrated by
their inability to avoid the handcuffs of the Supreme Court’s § 101 jurisprudence.
What Judges Lourie and Moore said in their opinion in Ariosa3 denying en banc review
sums up that frustration:
But focusing on the claims we have rather than those we might have had, the
claims here are directed to an actual use of the natural material of cffDNA.
They recite innovative and practical uses for it, particularly for diagnostic
testing: blood typing, sex typing, and screening for genetic abnormalities.
And it is undisputed that before this invention, the amplification and
detection of cffDNA from maternal blood, and use of these methods for
prenatal diagnoses, were not routine and conventional. But applying Mayo,
we are unfortunately obliged to divorce the additional steps from the asserted
natural phenomenon to arrive at a conclusion that they add nothing
innovative to the process.

2
3

to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent
eligible.”).
Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1375-76.
Id. at 1376.
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Moreover, the claims here are not abstract. There is nothing abstract about
performing actual physical steps on a physical material. And if the concern
is preemption of a natural phenomenon, this is, apparently, a novel process
and that is what patents are intended to incentivize and be awarded for. The
panel here also noted that there were other uses for cffDNA and other
methods of prenatal diagnostic testing using cffDNA that do not involve the
steps recited in the various claims. That fact should sufficiently address the
concern of improperly tying up future use of natural phenomena and laws.
In sum, it is unsound to have a rule that takes inventions of this nature out
of the realm of patent-eligibility on grounds that they only claim a natural
phenomenon plus conventional steps, or that they claim abstract concepts.
But I agree that the panel did not err in its conclusion that under Supreme
Court precedent it had no option other than to affirm the district court.
It is true that a number of the patent-hostile § 101 cases contain positive
statements indicating that the door is not completely closed to patent-friendly
holdings:
•

•
•

•
•
•

4
5
6
7
8
9

“’In choosing such expansive terms … modified by the comprehensive
‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
wide
scope.’… Congress took this permissive approach to patent
eligibility to ensure that ‘ingenuity should receive liberal
encouragement.‘”4
Reliance on Diehr to support the notion that “an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formulas to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.” 5
“The rule against patents on naturally occurring things is not without
limits, … for ‘all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon,
or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,’ and ‘too
broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate
patent law.’”6
Recognition of the need to consider the invention as a whole, rather than
dissecting the claims into old and new elements and then ignoring the
presence of the old elements in the analysis.7
§ 101 “precludes the broad contention that the term ‘process’ categorically
excludes business methods. The term ‘method’ … may include at least
some methods of doing business.”8
“It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing
a computer. We do not so hold.”9

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010), citing Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Id. at 611.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611.
Id. at 606-07.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
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But given the actual holdings in the bulk of the Supreme Court cases, one cannot
be too encouraged by these positive tidbits, and the Supreme Court seems disinclined
to fix the problem given its denial of cert in Ariosa and other § 101 cases, probably
requiring legislation to clear up the mess.
Nor is the problem restricted to § 101 issues. Over a period of more than fortyfive years, the CCPA and then the Federal Circuit had developed the teaching,
suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test for obviousness. This was a highly useful test for
resolving a critical patent validity issue, one that was relatively easy to apply and
which contributed meaningfully to the Federal Circuit’s goal of uniformity and
predictability. Yet, consistent with its aversion to bright-line rules, the Supreme Court
in KSR10 held that the TSM test provides “a helpful insight” but that it should “not
become [a] rigid mandatory formula[ ].”11
And still other examples could be given.
The bottom line is that, whatever the Supreme Court’s motivation in subjecting
the Federal Circuit to review of its patent holdings, most of which have resulted in
reversals, and notwithstanding the fact that a number of its decisions have resulted in
useful guides to the patent laws, the Supreme Court has significantly undermined the
Federal Circuit in achieving its goal of providing uniformity and predictability to the
implementation and enforcement of the patent laws. If, as I believe, the main culprits
are the Supreme Court’s aversion to bright-line rules and its interest in bringing the
Federal Circuit into conformity with the general law, that aversion and interest
applied sweepingly to the Federal Circuit are misguided and inimical to the public
interest in a sound patent system.

10
11

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007).
Id. at 419.

